than embracing the plenary power doctrine, the decisions proceeded from the premise that the federal power over immigration was in fact subject to constitutional constraints, and thus Yamataya did nothing more than follow the principles established in the earlier cases.
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

10
The evolution of the legal issues that were raised in Chae Chan Ping and Fong Yue Ting began with the signing of the Burlingame Treaty between China and the United States in 1868.
By the terms of that treaty, the two nations recognized "the inherent and inalienable right of a man to change his home and allegiance, and also the mutual advantage of free migration and migration of their citizens and subjects...for purposes of curiosity, of trade, or as permanent residents." In addition, the treaty guaranteed to travelers from one of the countries to the other "the same privileges, immunities and exemptions in respect to travel or residence, as may be enjoyed by the citizens or subjects of the most favored nation."
These provisions of the treaty were very unpopular in California and other western states, which had witnessed an influx of Chinese immigrants beginning with the gold rush that had begun in 1849. These immigrants had never been popular with much of the white population, and the hostility toward the Chinese intensified during an economic depression in California in the mid-1870s. Against this background, in 1880 the United States and China modified the original treaty to allow the United States to restrict Chinese immigration. But at the same time, the new treaty explicitly protected the rights of those who were in the United States prior to November 17, 1880, including their right to return after leaving the United States. 223 (1994) leave the ship and enter the country. The case was appealed to the Supreme Court after the United States Circuit Court for the Ninth Circuit had ruled against Chae Chan Ping. 12 Against the background of Yick Wo, in theory the attorneys in Chae Chan Ping might have argued that the Chinese Exclusion Acts were unconstitutional because they discriminated on the basis of race or national origin. However, any such argument would have seen far-fetched in the late nineteenth century. Beginning in 1790 and continuing through the mid-twentieth century, racial classifications were a staple of the federal naturalization statutes. A holding that racial classifications were unacceptable in immigration statutes would also have implicitly threatened the continued viability of these naturalization provisions as well. Thus, arguments based on race would have had virtually no chance to succeed in Chae Chan Ping, and the idea of making such arguments may well not even occurred to George Hoadley, James C. Carter, Harvey S. Brown and Thomas D. Riordan, the attorneys who represented Chae Chan Ping.
Hoadly and Carter were also foreclosed from arguing that, in general, federal statutes that abrogated treaty obligations could not be enforced by the courts. This contention had been considered and rejected in a number of decisions prior to the consideration of Chae Chan Ping.
Thus, for example, in 1888, in Whitney v. Robertson, the justices declared that "when a law is clear in its application, its validity cannot be assailed in the courts for want of conformity to stipulations of a current treaty not already executed. Considerations of that character belong to another department of government. The duty of the courts is to construe and give effect to the latest expression of the sovereign will." 13 12 The lower court proceedings in Chae Chan Ping are described in Gabriel J. Chin, Chae Chan Ping and Fong Yue Ting," in David A. Martin and Peter H. Schuck, eds., Immigration Stories 7-30 (2005) , at [11] [12] [13] Faced with these difficulties, Chae Chan Ping's attorneys took a different tack. They based their arguments primarily on the theory that, having obtained the certificate of re-entry by the 1882 and 1884 statutes, Chan Chae Ping had a vested right to re-enter the country, and that by mandating that the certificate not be honored, Congress had not simply denied him re-entry, but had in effect banished him from his home in the United States.
14 Moreover, they asserted that the 1888 statute was an unconstitutional ex post facto law. Moreover, in 1909 the Court explicitly analogized the congressional authority to exclude aliens to the power to regulate foreign commerce, noting that Whatever difference of opinion, if any, may have existed or does exist concerning the limitations of the power resulting from other provisions of the Constitution, so far as interstate commerce is concerned, it is not to be doubted that, from the beginning, Congress has exercised a plenary power in respect to the exclusion of merchandise brought from foreign countries; not alone directly, by the enactment of embargo statutes, but indirectly, as a necessary result of provisions contained in tariff legislation. It has also, in other than tariff legislation, exerted a police power over foreign commerce by provisions which, in and of themselves, amounted to the assertion of the right to exclude merchandise at discretion. * * * * As a result of the complete power of Congress over foreign commerce, it necessarily follows that no individual has a vested right to trade with foreign nations, which is so broad in character as to limit and restrict the power of
Congress to determine what articles of merchandise may be imported into this country, and the terms upon which a right to import may be exercised. Stranahan, 192 U.S. 470, 492-93 (1904) .
Despite these sweeping descriptions of the scope of the commerce power, no one would suggest that congressional enactments designed to regulate interstate commerce were free from the limitations imposed by the Bill of Rights and other constitutional provisions that applied to federal action more generally. Field's account of congressional authority over immigration should be understood in similar terms. He was not addressing the question of whether Congress was immune from constitutional constraints in dealing with immigration issues; rather, he was simply arguing that, despite the lack of specific language granting the federal government authority to adopt measures that limited immigration, the passage of such regulations was generally within the power of Congress.
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Against this background, Chae Chan Ping is best understood to stand only for the relatively uncontroversial proposition that, whatever the source of its authority, Congress has the power to control the entry of aliens into the United States, and that that power is constrained only by limitations imposed by the Constitution itself. Other than Field's implicit rejection of the specific claim made on behalf of Chae Chan Ping himself, the case quite literally has nothing to say about what the nature and scope of those limitations might be. Instead, the Court began to grapple with this issue three years later with its decision in Nishimura Ekiu v. United States.
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Nishimura Ekiu was not a challenge to actions taken under the Chinese Exclusion Acts themselves; instead, the case arose under the Immigration Act of 1891, which provided for the exclusion of any alien who was "likely to become a public charge." A woman who was excluded under this statute challenged the constitutionality of a provision that made the decision of an inspector of immigration on her status final, subject only to an appeal to the Commissioner 194 (1987) ; Motomura, supra n. , at 552.
Legomsky argues that Nishimura Ekiu rather than Chae Chan Ping is the source of plenary power doctrine. 44 Salyer, supra n. , at 28-31. 45 Brief for Appellees, Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651 (1892), at 13. with a wide variety of issues, including government collections, the disbarment of attorneys, taxation, and the requirement that doctors obtain a certificate in order to practice medicine. 46 This argument was also the basis for the reasoning of the Court itself. Justice Gray did not rely on decisions related to immigration issues to support his argument. Instead, he cited a taxation case and a case involving the collection of customs duties as authority for his conclusion. 47 The import of these citations is clear: rather than being judged by a special set of constitutional rules, immigration cases were to be judged under the same standards that applied to constitutional problems more generally.
A rarely-discussed portion of the Nishimura Ekiu opinion provides further evidence that the Court did not view the congressional power to control immigration as free from constitutional constraints. In addition to her other arguments, the petitioner argued that John L.
Hatch, the immigration inspector who made the decision to exclude her, lacked the legal authority to make the decision because he had been appointed by 49 Cite. 50 The background of the Geary Act is described in detail in Salyer, supra n. , at 43-46.
found without the requisite certificate was subject to arrest by local federal officials and deportation by a federal judge unless the laborer could show that his failure to procure the certificate was due to "accident, sickness, or other unavoidable cause," and also through the testimony of a "credible white witness" that he had in fact been a legal resident of the United
States at the time that the Geary Act was passed. In addition, the statute required any person of
Chinese descent found to be illegally in the country to be imprisoned for one year at hard labor.
The Chinese community was outraged at being singled out for the requirement that its members obtain the certificate of residence. while Ashton argued that, since banishment was punishment, it could not be imposed without a proceeding that provided the full panoply of protections available to criminal defendants. 64 The briefs were dominated by these and similar arguments.
Responding, Solicitor General Charles A. Aldritch characterized the Geary Act as "reasonable and humane," 1 an appropriate adjunct to the Chinese Exclusion Acts themselves, which in turn he asserted were necessary to protect the United States from an influx of "a people 62 Ashton Brief, supra n. , at 40. 63 Maxwell and Evarts Brief, supra n. , at 64-68. 64 Ashton Brief, supra n. , at 40. having habits often of the most pernicious character, working at wages that debase our own laboring classes, not bound by any considerations of the sanctity of an oath [and] given to evasions of other laws of Congress." 2 Aldritch was also unsparing in his criticism of the boycott of the statutory registration procedure and those who had encouraged the boycott.
We have in these cases subjects of an alien power who have deliberately defied the laws of the country in which they are resident, and under whose beneficent institutions they seek to live. Afforded every opportunity to obtain the certificates the American lawyer and patriot-terms that should be synonymous might well hesitate to make such a declaration against a law that could be easily complied with, and that without expense. And yet it has been proclaimed throughout the length and breadth of the land that compliance need not be yielded to the mandates of this law, because, in the opinion of certain eminent legal gentlemen, the law is unconstitutional.
67
Aldritch was equally aggressive in his response to the specific constitutional arguments against the Geary Act. He contended that the passage of the act was a "necessary and proper" means of carrying into effect a number of specific enumerated powers, and also that the power of 2 Id. at 12.
67 Id. at 11-12.
Congress to adopt the statute could be derived from general incidents of sovereignty, as well "a The Constitution has no extraterritorial effect, and those who have not come lawfully within our territory cannot claim any protection from its provisions; and it may be that the National Government, having full control of all matters relating to other nations, has the power to build, as it were, a Chinese wall around our borders, and absolutely forbid aliens to enter. But the Constitution has potency everywhere within the limits of our territory, and the powers which the National Government may exercise within such limits are those, and only those, given to it by that instrument.
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Similarly, while reaffirming his support for the decision in Chae Chan Ping, Field analogized the Geary Act to the much-maligned Alien Act that had been adopted during the administration of John Adams in 1798, proclaiming that
The moment any human being from a country at peace with us comes within the jurisdiction of the United States, with their consent --and such consent will always be implied when not expressly withheld, and, in the case of the Chinese laborers before us, was, in terms, given by the treaty referred to --he becomes subject to all their laws, is amenable to their punishment, and entitled to their protection. Arbitrary and despotic power can no more be exercised over them, with reference to their persons and property, than over the persons and property of native-born citizens. They differ only from citizens in that they cannot vote or hold any public office. As men having our common humanity, they are protected by all the guaranties of the Constitution. moreover, in the execution of the sentence against him, he is to be exposed, not only to the ordinary dangers of the sea, but to the peculiar casualties incident to a crisis of war and of unusual licentiousness on that element, and possibly to vindictive purposes, which his immigration itself may have provoked --if a banishment of this sort be not a punishment, and among the severest of punishments, it will be difficult to imagine a doom to which the name can be applied .
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Field took a similar tack, asserting that "deportation is thus imposed for neglect to obtain a certificate of residence, from which he can only escape by showing his inability to secure it from one of the causes named. That is the punishment for his neglect, and that, being of an infamous character, can only be imposed after indictment, trial, and conviction." 79 He also contended that deportation violated the Eighth Amendment ban on cruel and unusual punishment, drawing once again on Madison's analysis and averring that
The punishment is beyond all reason in its severity. It is out of all proportion to the alleged offense. It is cruel and unusual. As to its cruelty, nothing can exceed a forcible deportation from a country of one's residence, and the breaking up of all the relations of friendship, family, and business there contracted. The laborer may be seized at a distance from his home, his family, and his business, and taken before the judge for his condemnation, without permission to visit his home, see his family, or complete any unfinished business. Mr. Madison well pictures its character in his powerful denunciation of the alien law of 1798, in his celebrated 78 Id. at 740-41 (Brewer, J., dissenting).
report upon the resolutions, from which we have cited, and concludes, as we have seen, that if a banishment of the sort described be not a punishment, and among the severest of punishments, it will be difficult to imagine a doom to which the name can be applied.
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However, these arguments did not persuade a majority of the Court. Five justices sided with Aldritch and rejected the constitutional challenge to the Geary Act. 81 Speaking for the majority, Justice Horace Gray began by addressing the issue of federal power in detail.
Analogizing Fong Yue Ting to Chae Chan Ping, Gray first concluded that Congress had inherent authority to exclude or expel aliens generally, asserting that "[t]he right to exclude or to expel all aliens, or any class of aliens, absolutely or upon certain conditions, in war or in peace, [is] an inherent and inalienable right of every sovereign and independent nation, essential to its safety, its independence, and its welfare." 82 and that "t]he power to exclude aliens, and the power to expel them, rest upon one foundation, are derived from one source, are supported by the same reasons, and are, in truth, but parts of one and the same power." 83 However, Gray plainly viewed the issue of federal power as independent of the question of whether the manner in which Congress had exercised the power through the Geary Act was consistent with the Constitution, declaring that
[t]he power to exclude or to expel aliens, being a power affecting international relations, is vested in the political departments of the government, and is to be characterized the requirement that a "credible white witness" be produced to verify the immigrant's status as "within the acknowledged power of every legislature to prescribe the evidence which shall be received, and the effect of that evidence in the courts of its own Government" 94 and analogized the requirement to the mandate that an applicant for naturalization produce testimony from a citizen attesting to the fact that the applicant had been a resident of the United States for five years. 95 These arguments formed the backdrop for Gray's conclusion that the portions of the Geary Act that were before the Court in Fong Yue Ting were constitutionally unobjectionable.
The dissenters criticized this conclusion in unusually blunt terms. Field asserted that
The decision of the Court, and the sanction it would give to legislation depriving resident aliens of the guaranties of the Constitution, fill me with apprehensions.
Those guaranties are of priceless value to every one resident in the country, whether citizen or alien. I cannot but regard the decision as a blow against constitutional liberty when it declares that Congress has the right to disregard the guaranties of the Constitution intended for the protection of all men domiciled in the country with the consent of the Government, in their rights of person and property. However one evaluates the respective merits of the arguments of the majority and the dissent, one point emerges clearly. The decision in Fong Yue Ting was not based in any meaningful sense on considerations that were viewed as uniquely associated with congressional power over immigration. Instead, as it had in Nishimura Ekiu, the majority simply concluded that the Geary Act passed constitutional muster when measured against the same standards that were applied to other exercises of congressional power.
EPILOGUE-YAMATAYA V. FISHER
The Court continued to grapple with the legal problems raised by the regulation of immigration in the first decade of the twentieth century. The background and significance of Ju Toy are described in Salyer, supra n. , at 99-114.
101 189 U. S. 86 (1903) .
to be a person "likely to become a public charge" and ordered deported by the Secretary of the Treasury on July 23 rd . The deportee asserted the issuance of the order violated the due process clause, with her attorneys arguing that, because she did not speak English, she had not had a meaningful opportunity to be heard. The government responded by denying that the Due Process Clause had any applicability in deportation proceedings, asserting that "deportation merely enforcing the withholding of the privilege of coming here or remaining here" 102 and that "liberty is no more involved than property or life."
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The Court upheld the deportation order over the dissents of Justices David Brewer and Rufus Peckham. However, the most widely-cited passage from Justice John Marshall Harlan's majority opinion also rejected the government's most sweeping assertions of authority, declaring that this court has never held, nor must we now be understood as holding, that administrative officers, when executing the provisions of a statute involving the liberty of persons, may disregard the fundamental principles that inhere in 'due process of law' as understood at the time of the adoption of the Constitution. One of these principles is that no person shall be deprived of his liberty without opportunity, at some time, to be heard, before such officers, in respect of the matters upon which that liberty depends,-not necessarily an opportunity upon a regular, set occasion, and according to the forms of judicial procedure, but one that will secure the prompt, vigorous action contemplated by Congress, and at the same time be appropriate to the nature of the case upon which such officers are as these misconstrue the import of the majority opinion in Fong Yue Ting. As already noted, far from claiming that deportation decisions enjoyed any special exemption from the strictures of the Fifth Amendment, Justice Gray relied on principles of due process analysis that had been established in other contexts and argued that the procedures established by the Geary Act were consistent with those principles. The major point of disagreement between the majority and the dissents was over the question of whether deportation should be considered a criminal penalty-a point that was simply not raised in Yamataya. Viewed from this perspective, the opinions fit comfortably together; the majority opinion in Yamataya was simply noting that, just as in cases 104 Yamataya v. Fisher, 186 U.S. at 100-01. 105 Salyer, supra n. , at 173.
106 Motomura, supra n. , at 554.
where other interests were at stake, the Due Process Clause required the government to provide potential deportees with some opportunity to be heard.
CONCLUSION: REORIENTING THE CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS OF IMMIGRATION CASES
Properly read, the cases from Chae Chan Ping through Yamataya v. Fisher do not support the proposition that federal legislation on immigration issues should generally be free from constitutional limitations. To the contrary, the Court analyzed those regulations under the standards applicable to constitutional challenges more generally and simply concluded that the relevant statutes did not run afoul of the limitations that had been established in the case law.
Admittedly, the principles that guided the Court's analysis were quite different from those which govern modern constitutional adjudication. Nonetheless, they did not reflect the belief that immigration-related decisions were somehow entitled to special deference.
Of course, in theory at least, it might be possible to provide a persuasive justification for limiting the scope of judicial review in immigration cases. But the point is that any such justification must be evaluated on its own merits. The justices should not feel that a more activist approach to the review of immigration statutes would be somehow inconsistent with the foundational decisions of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century.
